Monday, January 15, 2007

Limmud NY: Reform halakhah panel

(Crossposted to Jewschool)

Hi from the Catskills (or should I say, the Catskill)!

On Shabbat afternoon I was on a panel on "The Role of Halakhah in Reform Judaism", moderated by Rabbi Leon Morris of the Skirball Center for Adult Jewish Learning. The other panelists were Rabbi Joan Glazer Farber of the Union for Reform Judaism, and Rabbi Mark Sameth of Pleasantville Community Synagogue. (So yes, I was the token non-rabbi on the panel.)

By request, here is some of the discussion from the panel as best I can recall. I'm mostly just going to post what I said (because I'm not worried about misrepresenting myself, but might misrepresent others), but if other panelists or attendees want to post their recollections, please do so in the comments.

There was no one on the panel representing a "Classical Reform" perspective or a "Reform Judaism isn't halachic" perspective, but the views expressed were far from homogeneous.

Some personal information, since people are wondering whether I belong on the panel: I consider myself a Reform expatriate. I practice what I consider to be Reform Judaism (as an ideology), though I am not currently affiliated with the Reform movement (as a set of institutions). So I focused my remarks on the former, not the latter.

We started by sharing our thoughts on the relationship between Reform Judaism and halakhah. Here's what I said: Often when we get into discussions about identifying one's own movement or other movements as "halakhic" or "not halakhic", these distinctions are about identity and politics and semantics, and not necessarily about substance, since there is not a single agreed-upon definition of what halakhah is, and it's just a question of how you define it. If we define "halakhah" by the Orthodox definition, then Reform Judaism is obviously not halakhic by that definition; if we line the denominations up on a scale from 1 to Orthodox, then of course Reform will come up short. If, on the contrary, we define "halakhah" as binding religious obligations, then all Reform views would agree that there is halakhah in Reform Judaism -- even if you hold like the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885, which held that the ritual commandments in the Torah do not apply in our time, then you still would hold that the Torah's ethical commandments are obligatory.

So we can start from the assumption that there exists Reform halakhah, and that it is different in nature from Orthodox halakhah. I want to point out two significant ways in which the Reform understanding of halakhah is different from halakhah as understood by other movements:

1) There is a concept called yeridat hadorot (descent of the generations) that informs Orthodox halakhah. The idea is that the Written and Oral Torah were revealed at some time in the past, and each successive generation is farther and farther from the original revelation. This impacts halakhah because there is a mishnah in Masechet Eduyot that says that a beit din (Jewish court) cannot overturn a decision of a previous beit din unless the later one is greater than the earlier one in both wisdom and number. Since our generation is farther from revelation than previous generations, we are presumed to have less wisdom, and therefore we cannot supplant earlier halakhic decisions, but can only work within them. In Orthodox halakhah, the transmission of tradition can be compared to a game of Telephone, where the signal gets weaker each time it is passed on. Reform Judaism, in contrast, would compare this transmission to that game where you go around telling a story, and each person adds a word or a sentence. Instead of yeridat hadorot, the operative principle is, in Isaac Newton's words, "standing on the shoulders of giants". By this understanding, we are greater in wisdom than previous generations, because our generation knows everything that they knew, plus everything that we have learned since then. Therefore, the tradition continues to grow and develop. This is a small-p progressive rather than a small-c conservative understanding of halakhah.

2) Authority. All Jewish religious movements would agree that God is the ultimate authority, and would also agree that we cannot communicate directly with God. We have texts that were written (or Written) in the past, but all would agree that there are decisions to be made in the present time about our practice, and the question is about who has the authority to make those decisions. This is a case that challenges the way people typically line the movements up on a spectrum: the Conservative movement is at one extreme and the Reform movement on another, with Orthodox in the middle. (This is about the movement ideologies on paper, not necessarily about how people actually practice.) In the Conservative movement, there is a law committee that makes halakhic decisions for the movement. Even if they come up with multiple answers, they still define the range of options, and the local rabbi selects an option from this range, and the individual is supposed to follow halakhah as determined by this hierarchy. In the Orthodox world, there is no centralized committee, so this authority is more diffuse, but there are rabbis who render halakhic decisions, and individuals follow various rabbis' rulings. In Reform Judaism, the responsibility of interpreting Torah to determine the halakhah that is to be observed is on each individual.

Following up on this, Leon Morris asked a question about autonomy. He said he was talking about autonomy the way it should ideally work, since we all know how it works out in reality. I responded to this throwaway comment, saying that I'm not sure we do know how it works in reality. I don't think that informed autonomy has really been implemented in the Reform movement. One might look at Reform-affiliated Jews and say that they're acting autonomously, perhaps too autonomously, but I say we shouldn't confuse apathy with autonomy. Sure, people are choosing not to do Jewish things much of the time, but when they are doing Jewish things, they are entirely dependent on someone else to tell them what to do and to do things for them. Informed autonomy hasn't been implemented, because most Jews in the Reform movement are neither informed nor autonomous. Before we knock autonomy, first we should try it.

LM said that his view of how autonomy should work in Reform Judaism (and please correct me if I'm misrepresenting this) is that an HUC professor might say to a student "I noticed this morning at davening that you weren't wearing tefillin. Why is that?", and the student would respond with reasons why s/he doesn't wear tefillin. Thus, people should be familiar with the tradition, and autonomously define their relationship to it, and if someone wants to reject an element of it, s/he should have a reason. I disagree with this view of tradition. I said that to treat "The Tradition" as something static and monolithic is to commit an act of Artscrollization. Jewish tradition is something that has always evolved over time, and this tradition includes the last 200 years of Reform Jewish history, which have created their own facts on the ground for us to take into account, and the tradition will continue to evolve and develop into the future, and autonomy means that each of us is an active participant in that development.

We shouldn't assume that in the state of nature everyone is Orthodox, and that any difference from Orthodoxy requires justification. In the state of nature we're wherever we started, and we might change from that point. So for the first n years of my life I didn't wear tefillin, but I didn't have a specific justification for this; it was simply because I grew up not wearing tefillin, so that was the default.

One of the panelists asked me how I would define Kol Zimrah. I said that KZ is not affiliated institutionally with the Reform movement or any other movement, and doesn't identify itself with a movement label. It is the case empirically that people in the KZ community are exercising informed autonomy about their Jewish practice, but Kol Zimrah as an organization doesn't take an ideological stance about this. However, I have found that the independent Jewish communities I am involved in, like Kol Zimrah and the National Havurah Committee, are closer to what I would want in a Reform community (in that there is informed autonomy) than the actual Reform movement is.

LM asked about individuals giving up some of their autonomy for the sake of creating community. He gave the example of a community agreeing to adhere to some practice, even something that isn't when the community is all together, e.g. everyone agrees to daven mincha every day wherever they are, to connect them to the rest of the community.

I said that the Reform model of halakha should be not the Shulchan Aruch (a set of rules), but the Talmud (a conversation, where Rabbi X says this and Rabbi Y says that and they talk about their reasons). I think if the entire community in this example were engaged in a discourse about mincha, that would bring the community together just as effectively as everyone deciding to do it.

One attendee asked what the deal was with Kutz Camp having visiting day on Shabbat. I got to tell my story about visiting my brother at Kutz (both to address this question and illustrate what autonomous Jewish practice could look like), but said that it would have been more convenient if visiting day hadn't been on Shabbat.

Another attendee asked why this conversation was happening at Limmud NY, and not happening at the URJ Biennial. I said that we weren't the ones to answer that!

Someone pointed out the need for education for informed autonomy to be feasible, as well as for Reform Jews to operate in a pluralistic setting with other Jews. I agreed wholeheartedly, and said some of the stuff about education and identity from the end of Hilchot Pluralism Part VI.

That's all for now, since it's time to jam, but in a later post I'll say some of the stuff on this topic that I didn't get to say on the panel.

37 comments:

  1. I was surprised (though in retrospect it makes perfect sense) to hear the "standing on the shoulders of giants" [vs. yeridat hadorot] articulated as a reform position.

    I'd encountered it as a rather edgy idea during an orthodox learning program, and associated it with that. that teacher did not exactly identify as "orthodox", (and therefore gets credit for being one of the people who introduced me to the possibilities of not following a single denomination.)

    On a separate note, I enjoyed meeting the real live person behind mah rabu :)

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  2. On a spectrum between the Conservative subjugation to the Law Committee and the Orthodox subjugation to the local rabbi, how did the Reform personal autonomy end up in the middle. Seems to me like the Orthodox are in the middle of that spectrum.

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  3. gah, I hate that I'm not there. Will you start bugging me to go to stuff like this, NHC, etc?

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  4. I'm so glad you posted this! I'm thrilled that there was a panel on Reform halakha, and also thrilled that you were present on that panel. So much of what you say here resonates for me that if I were to reprint it in this comment, I'd wind up reprinting your whole post. :-)

    More later, I hope. Meanwhile, yasher koach!http:

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  5. to be accurate, anonymous,
    subjugation is a pretty strong and inappropriately used word, don't you think? i think what you meant to say was deference, perhaps, as in to defer to one's authority.
    also, to be accurate, the Conservative position also hold the local rabbi as ultimately authoritative, the mara d'atra. the rabbi utilizes the CJLS' decisions as resources to create his own p'sak halachah.

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  6. you might want to take a look at my 'orthodox' exposition of yeridat hadorot (and also used the midgets-on-giants metaphor) here:
    http://adderabbi.blogspot.com/2005/03/pygmies-on-shoulders-of-giants-attempt.html
    there was an excellent (and very talmudic) comment thread on it, available here:
    http://www.haloscan.com/comments/adderabbi/111159310110461842/
    enjoy

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  7. Rebecca M-
    I think it's articulated to some degree in the CCAR's Centenary Perspective (1976):

    "Lawgivers and prophets, historians and poets gave us a heritage whose study is a religious imperative and whose practice is our chief means to holiness. Rabbis and teachers, philosophers and mystics, gifted Jews in every age amplified the Torah tradition. For millennia, the creation of Torah has not ceased and Jewish creativity in our time is adding to the chain of tradition."

    And yes, it was good to meet you and to associate real people with faceless commenters!

    Anonymous-
    I said that Orthodox is in the middle of the spectrum. I was listing them in order from one side to the other, not in thesis-antithesis-synthesis style.

    dlevy-
    Consider yourself bugged! August 6-12. Be there.

    Rachel-
    Thanks!

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  8. Thanks BZ, for a fascinating read.

    One note, however: Kutz ended visiting days on Shabbat many years ago. We do crazy things at Kutz on Shabbat now like staying on camp, davening before eating, lighting candels before Shabbat and not during it, and studying over seudat shlishit.

    Silly reformers...

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  9. Did they previously light candles during Shabbat (even in the summer when Shabbat starts at like 8:30)?

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  10. Or are you talking about havdalah?

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  11. Dlevy - consider this more bugging.liv

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  12. Contrary to what you wrote, the concept of "yeridat hadorot" does not inform all of orthodox halacha. It is one of many understandings of the development of halacha within the orthodox movement along with others i'm sure you're familiar with, such as "lo bashamayim hi" - this is interpreted in many modern orthodox settings not just as a point about a tanur or a comment on how great the chachamim of the talmud were but indeed as a contrast to the yeridat hadorot understanding (and too add to a previous comment, i too have been taught the "standing on the shoulders of giants" conception of the halachic process from orthodox rabbis and teachers"). While yeridat hadorot may not figure into any conception of "reform halacha" - thus being one of many differences between the two - it is quite erroneous to state that the concept informs all of orthodox halacha or all orthodox understandings of halacha.

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  13. ADDeRabbi and Anonymous-
    That's good to hear. I had heard the oven of Akhnai understood by Orthodox (and possibly Conservative) people to canonize chaza"l while disempowering our generation, in effect putting the Talmud and some gedolim "bashamayim".

    I'm glad to see that Reb Chaim HaQoton doesn't speak for all Orthodox Jews. :)

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  14. there's also the halakhic concept of halakha ke-batrai, that decisors closer to you in time have more weight than those farther back.

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  15. I'm glad to see that Reb Chaim HaQoton doesn't speak for all Orthodox Jews

    find me the one who does :)

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  16. BZ- not surprised as in didn't believe it; just hadn't thought of it that way, and fascinated by what is either a parallel development, or more interdenominational sharing of ideas than I'd expected.

    here's my question: could someone give a concrete example of a modern halachic issue/ relatively recent psak, from on ortho source, that changes halacha based on some form of the idea of "standing on the shoulders of giants"?

    my understanding is that if these changes happen, they do so in the format of "well we aren't actually changing anything; it's just that this isn't really a case of X".

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  17. Rebecca M -
    the point about the way one views the halchik process that is being discussed in these comments isn't about whether one says "this halacha changes previous halcha" or whether one says "this halacha is simply a different case than what was addressed by previous halacha." The difference is how one's view of what occurs in the development shapes a movement's ability to do either of the above. BZ contended that all of orthodox halacha is informed by an idea of yeridat hadorot. Those of us here challenging that are simply pointing out that in many orthodox day schools and schools of thought, that is not how the process is taught. We have been taught on the one hand that the halachick process can be viewed as a yerida, and that each generation gets farther from the "TRUTH," or, on the other hand, for example, that Rabbi Soleveitchik's teshuvot, whether or not they seem to "change" or "re-explain" a halchik idea or rule are not necessarily rejections of, or SMARTER than, the rabbis that came before, but rather a result of the fact that R. Soleveitchik had the benefit of reading Rashi, Maimonides, and R. Moshe, etc. etc. but Rashi couldn't have read Maimonides, R. Soleveitchik or R. Moshe!
    This being said, the practical and resulting differences BZ chronicles in this post are, in my opinion, accurate, telling, and insightful (not to mention a good tochacha), but the sweeping statements made (and which he often erroneously makes) about why orthodox people or processes result in the despicable things that they often result in, simply allow those orthodox people reading this blog to dismiss his wonderful posts for lack of knowledge (when many times those statements are tangential, and most of his points about why orthodoxy sucks are right on without them).

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  18. The goal of that part of the post wasn't to talk about "why orthodoxy sucks", but just to highlight differences between Orthodox and Reform ideologies. I was attempting to do this somewhat objectively (though it's clear which position I hold). I was avoiding canards like "Orthodox halacha is completely static, while liberal halacha is open to change" or "Orthodox halacha is monolithic, while liberal halacha is open to diversity", since I know that's an inaccurate portrayal of Orthodoxy (outside of Artscroll).

    If anyone is the recipient of a tochecha in this post, it's the Reform movement, for failing to live up to their own ideals.

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  19. woah-

    anonymous, I've got a solid 13 years of formal ortho education under my belt, including a post high school year learning in Israel. So yes, I'm fairly aware of what gets taught.

    You also seem to be arguing against points I did not make, but perhaps I was unclear. So here goes.

    I was deliberately differentitating between a concept of "standing on the shoulders of giants" that has

    (1) practical implications in halacha (e.g. "now that we understand LGBTQ issues more fully than before, the halacha must change accordingly")

    vs.

    (2)hashkafic implications ("wow, it's so cool that we can have such a fuller, richer, view of judaism than previous generations because we can draw upon all their cumulative teachings")

    I have encountered (2) but not (1) in ortho circles. So we aren't disagreeing; I'm just interested in the nafka mina [practical implications].

    Also, what statements regarding "orthodox people or processes [that] result in the despicable things that they often result in" are you referring to?

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  20. Ben contributed a great deal to this panel, and although we don't agree (or especially because we don't) it was great to engage in this conversation with you. I wished I had been a panelist instead of the moderator, because there was a lot I wanted to say in response to some of his comments. Thank Gd for Jewschool and MahRabu.

    I totally agree that informed autonomy has not yet been implemented. My "throwaway" comment was really intended as a critique on the way in which this so-called "autonomy" that is being practiced bears little resemblance to what the theologians of Reform Judaism had (and have) in mind. Autonomy is, for better or worse, an inescapable aspect of our (post-)modern lives.

    While I agree with Ben that "the tradition" is neither static nor monolithic, I chose Tefillin in my example because this has been part of the normative Jewish practice for thousands of years (they even found Tefillin in the Dead Sea caves used by sectarian Jews). I think it is highly problematic to call practices such as these "Orthodox." I was suggesting a "default" position which takes mitzvot seriously. When a Reform Jew encounters normative Jewish practices which have been observed throughout the ages and which pose no contemporary ethical objection, the burden of proof should not be on the tradition to prove itself worthy of continued observance, but rather on the individual who rejects it. This was my point.

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  21. Leon-
    Thanks for writing in, and thanks for moderating the panel (though I also wish you had been on it). I agree that tefillin aren't inherently "Orthodox". [I wear tefillin, at least in theory. In practice not so often, because I'm not a morning person, but if I were already at a weekday shacharit service as in your example, I'd be wearing tefillin.] My comment that "we shouldn't assume that in the state of nature everyone is Orthodox" wasn't just in regard to things like tefillin (which go way back), but also in response to questions I've been asked (by people who were just curious, not accusatory) along the lines of "Why do you do X on Shabbat?" (where X is one of various technologies invented after the Reform/Orthodox split, so the classical sources say nothing directly about it) or "Why do you play musical instruments on Shabbat?" (which was done in the mikdash, and wasn't considered so problematic until the backlash to Reform). I'm not ascribing this view to you, but in these questions, the path chosen by contemporary Orthodox Judaism tends to be privileged as the default. But you're right that tefillin doesn't belong in this category.

    However, I take issue with the idea that a Reform Jew (raised in the Reform movement) who doesn't wear tefillin is "rejecting" something. This rejection already took place several generations ago. Someone who doesn't wear tefillin today isn't rejecting them anew (any more than s/he is actively rejecting korbanot or targum), but is maintaining the practices of his/her parents and grandparents. Since I'm not Classical Reform (which may have developed a yeridat hadorot attitude of its own, but placing the time of revelation in the 19th century, rather than Sinai or Yosef Caro), I think this person would be entirely justified if s/he decided to reject his/her parents' tradition and to start wearing tefillin. But this would be a change and perhaps a discontinuity, not a "continued observance".

    Ok, this person is me. If it weren't for the Judaism passed on to me by my parents and grandparents, I wouldn't be here having this conversation. So I owe it to them to engage their Jewish practice seriously (even if I ultimately arrive at a different conclusion), alongside engaging "normative Jewish practices which have been observed throughout the ages".

    Also, there are people who "take mitzvot seriously" and don't wear tefillin; they might understand the mitzvah of "bind them as a sign upon your hand" metaphorically (which is probably the peshat).

    If I understand you correctly, are you proposing a two-tiered halachic system, where there is a baseline halacha that is observed by default (in the absence of individual amendments), which can be autonomously amended by individuals who object to parts of it? If so, from what point in Jewish history would you derive this baseline halacha? The Torah? The Talmud? The Shulchan Aruch? The eve of the Reform/Orthodox split? The practices of Orthodox Jews today? The decisions of the CCAR Responsa Committee? And why?

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  22. And because practices like tefillin "have been observed throughout the ages and ... pose no contemporary ethical objection", I would place the burden of proof for renewed (not continued) observance very low. Perhaps that's all the justification that's necessary. But it still requires an active decision.

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  23. My point was that a Reform Jew who does not wear tefillin SHOULD feel that he or she is rejecting something. I think that would be evidence of the kind of autonomy that you and I are hoping (waiting?) for in the Reform movement.

    I love your question about where the baseline halakhah is? I need to think about that. If I said that baseline is the Torah itself, then I am a Karaite. If the baseline is the Mishnah, I miss out on the wider range of interpretations that the Gemarra provides. If I say the Gemarra, then there is no way I can understand it without the Rishonim. Ein l'davar sof (there is no end to this).

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  24. More questions:

    How long does a practice have to be in disuse before it ceases to be the default (to be accepted or rejected)?

    Can the baseline halacha ever be amended?

    Would your stance on tefillin and "rejection" be any different if all Jews had stopped wearing tefillin in the 19th century and then a few people (like you and me) decided to bring it back in 2007?

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  25. And because practices like tefillin "have been observed throughout the ages and ... pose no contemporary ethical objection", I would place the burden of proof for renewed (not continued) observance very low.

    Don't be so quick to dismiss the existence of contemporary ethical objections around tefillin. I know a not-insignificant number of ethical vegetarians/vegans who believe that wearing tefillin violates tzaar baalei chayim. (A shopkeeper on the Lower East Side once spent 15 minutes ranting at me just because someone had come into his store earlier in the day asking for vegan tefillin or tefillin made out of ribbons or something like that.) In any case, some people have developed a solution (similar to what some do vis-a-vis diamond engagement rings) of only purchasing or wearing tefillin that once belonged to someone else and for which no new animal was killed. Just an interesting FYI...

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  26. My point was that a Reform Jew who does not wear tefillin SHOULD feel that he or she is rejecting something. I think that would be evidence of the kind of autonomy that you and I are hoping (waiting?) for in the Reform movement.

    Right. If Reform is about personal, informed choice, then one is obliged to seriously consider a practice like laying tefillin regardless of his/her grandparents' rejection of it. You can't have it both ways. Either you're personally responsible for making these decisions, or you're not. Falling back on a family tradition because there's something you don't want to do, but rejecting the concept of tradition in a larger sense, is selective reasoning.

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  27. BKE-

    I think you might be arguing with a straw man. Where did I say that I was "rejecting the concept of tradition in a larger sense"? On the contrary, the idea of "standing on the shoulders of giants" demands an engagement with tradition, both ancient and modern.

    I agree that one should "seriously consider" ideas and practices from anywhere in the Jewish historical continuum, whether from the Torah, the majority opinion in the Talmud, the minority opinion in the Talmud, some obscure geonic manuscript, the minhag of our grandparents, or something we read about on a blog. I never said that someone who grew up not wearing tefillin shouldn't start wearing tefillin, or shouldn't consider it.

    What I reject (which may be a straw man in itself, since no one has said this explicitly) is the idea of a Torah-in-exile - the idea that there exists a specific moment when Jewish tradition is/was in pristine form, such that we can determine our personal practices in reference to that moment. And in the absence of such a moment, the only moment we can use as a reference point is the present. Of course, we can change things from where they are in the present, but the present is the starting point. And because we weren't making fully independent decisions as children, what we did in our parents' household was our original starting point. But that's just the beginning, not the end. From that starting point we can study traditions from the past, present, and future, and make informed decisions. I don't think I'm being inconsistent or "selective".

    Also, in saying "Falling back on a family tradition because there's something you don't want to do", you're suggesting that this is just done out of convenience or kula. This is false. I don't eat kitniyot on Pesach. I maintain this restrictive practice even though I think it's ridiculous for a number of reasons, and even though there is a longstanding tradition of eating kitniyot during Pesach (mentioned in rabbinic sources, observed until medieval times by Ashkenazim, and observed through the present by Sephardim). In this case, my family tradition wins out for now (though that doesn't mean it always will). And yes, I'm taking personal responsibility for that decision.

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  28. Since I'm not a Reform Jew in any way at all (although I grew up Reform) I shall refrain from any comment whatsoever on that part of the content; but since you did ask for comments, I have to note that the description of authority in Conservative Judaism is incorrect.
    The Committee on Jewish Law and Standards does not make halakha for the movement.
    In fact, NOTHING that the CJLS undertakes to study and either pass or not pass has any effect whatsoever on rabbis in the movement - they are actually only a resource - like keeping an encyclopedia around for when you don't have the time to do the scientific proofs on your own time.

    CJ rabbis are mara d'atra - master of the place- for their own establishments. They make halachic rulings which may or may not be based upon CJLS rulings. The CJLS itself has that funny two tiered system of a majority and a minority (6) votes pass. The reason this works is because they're only recommendations by those we consider learned in the movement(That's why it was such a big deal for Joel Roth to resign from the CJLS after the last er, upheaval).
    There are actually only four rulings that are binding on every rabbi in the movement, and these were subject to a vote of all the member rabbis, not simply of the CJLS (Those four are all continuity matters. Drumroll: no patrilineal descent; conversion must have mikveh -and milah as well, for males; a person who was previously married must have a get - a Jewish halachic writ of divorce; no rabbi may officiate at or attend an intermarriage - which to our great and ongoing discomfort, often means that we cannot officiate at the marriages of Jews who grew up or were converted Reform in the USA).

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  29. If CJLS rulings aren't binding, then why couldn't JTS have admitted gay and lesbian rabbinical students before the most recent set of teshuvot? What was significant about these teshuvot passing?

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  30. And if it's just an encyclopedia with no legal force, then why require 6 votes for a minority opinion? Why not just 1 (Rabbi X says ____ for this reason)? That's good enough for a Supreme Court dissenting opinion (which also has no legal force).

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  31. I'm told that the CJLS used to have a 1 vote minimum for minority opinions, rather than 6. The rule was changed after some member several decades ago asserted his intention to vote in favor of...something. I think it was patrilineal descent, but I could be wrong.

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  32. Kol Ra'ash Gadol says:The CJLS itself has that funny two tiered system of a majority and a minority (6) votes pass.

    As far as I understand (having sat through more than a year and a half CJLS meetings recently) there is no longer a system of majority and minority votes. As noted in the Rabbinical Assembly document,A Brief History of the CJLS, "positions accruing six or more votes are validated official positions of the RA. V'zeh hu.

    BZ asks: If CJLS rulings aren't binding, then why couldn't JTS have admitted gay and lesbian rabbinical students before the most recent set of teshuvot? What was significant about these teshuvot passing?

    Because they felt equal ordination was a controversial issue, both American seminaries agreed to be bound by a CJLS decision on the issue. Both agreed not to admit openly gay and lesbian students until the CJLS issued a teshuvah saying it was okay.

    While Kol Ra'ash Gadol is technically right that regular CJLS decisions are not binding on Conservative rabbis, I have encountered a fair number of rabbis in the field who will not act against a CJLS teshuvah.

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  33. Interesting. In the original post I wrote the disclaimer "This is about the movement ideologies on paper, not necessarily about how people actually practice", to distinguish e.g. between Reform Judaism in theory (in which kulanu chachamim, kulanu nevonim, and everyone autonomously interprets halacha) and in practice (in which "we're Reformed, so we don't do x").

    But it seems from this discussion that in the Conservative movement, the CJLS does not have the authority to make binding halachic decisions either in theory (as KRG says) or in practice (since the average Conservative-affiliated or -identified Jew doesn't recognize that authority), but does have that authority on some intermediate level in between (through individual institutions and rabbis who give it such authority, as EAR says).

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  34. Desh-
    If CJLS teshuvot are really just advisory opinions signed by people recognized (through their membership on the committee) to be knowledgeable, then there should be no difference between the CJLS passing a teshuva with only one rabbi voting in favor of it (and clearly indicating that Rav Ploni was the only signatory), and that same rabbi self-publishing the same teshuva on his blog (or whatever the equivalent was back then - mimeographed pamphlets, let's say) with a bio saying "Rav Ploni is a member of the CJLS".

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  35. BZ: In some sense, yes, there's no difference how the one rabbi publishes his teshuvah. And perhaps the CJLS would be a more effective body if they only debated and never voted.

    But it's also the case that the CJLS does vote, and that they have some designation (however artificial and a priori meaningless) that a particular vote has "passed" or "not passed" (or, in the passed, "passed in the minority" or whatever). And it's the case that a vote's designation holds meaning for some people, perhaps above and beyond the circumstances that led to that vote. So whether ploni's sole "yes" vote is enough for a teshuvah to pass or not can have some sort of effect, even if the vote isn't actually binding on anyone.

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  36. "LM asked about individuals giving up some of their autonomy for the sake of creating community. He gave the example of a community agreeing to adhere to some practice, even something that isn't when the community is all together, e.g. everyone agrees to daven mincha every day wherever they are, to connect them to the rest of the community.

    I said that the Reform model of halakha should be not the Shulchan Aruch (a set of rules), but the Talmud (a conversation, where Rabbi X says this and Rabbi Y says that and they talk about their reasons). I think if the entire community in this example were engaged in a discourse about mincha, that would bring the community together just as effectively as everyone deciding to do it."

    This one hits the nail on the head. I don't think it's possible to have an entire community engage in a discourse, for a variety of reasons -- different intellectual abilities, economic factors (time, money, etc.), life situations, etc. -- but you _can_ have a community (be-gadol) engage in a ritual practice. I also think engaging in uniform ritual practices is a different kind of experience, and fulfills a different set of very important human needs, than a discourse. I find my rebbe's argument that one has a _moral_ obligation to engage in such rituals for the sake of other's needs quite compelling. (Hata'i ani mazkir hayom -- I'll send you those articles ASAP!)

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  37. I'm coming into this discussion late, but I have a suggestion to answer the "what is the baseline halakhah" question: that of the community. If in a given community it is uncommon to lay tefillin, one should have a good reason to do so, and vice versa.

    (Ironically, even though no Orthodox Jew would be likely to advocate this position, it's actually very Orthodox...)

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