Showing posts with label Makkot. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Makkot. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
Whip it
This Sunday, 26 August 2007, 12 Elul 5767, at 11 am, ALG and I are making a siyyum on Masechet Makkot in the City, County, and State of New York. All are invited. We'll be in Central Park if the weather is clement, and indoors otherwise. Email mahrabu at gmail if you'd like to come and that information wasn't precise enough.
Sunday, June 24, 2007
Fox in socks
ALG and I have completed our study of Masechet Makkot. Stay tuned for a formal siyyum in late July or August.
To calculate when I'll be finished with Sha"s at this rate:
To calculate when I'll be finished with Sha"s at this rate:
- Berachot, chapter 1 (1999-2000, with JER): 11 dapim
- Berachot, chapter 2 (2000, with JER): 5 dapim
- Berachot, chapter 4 (2004-05, remotely with EAR): 5 dapim
- Berachot, chapter 7 (2000-01, with EAKO): 7 dapim
- Berachot, chapter 8 (2004, with EAR): 2 dapim
- Sukkah (2002-04, with MR): 55 dapim
- Rosh Hashanah (2004-05, with MAK): 34 dapim
- Megillah (2005-06, with MAK): 31 dapim
- Sanhedrin, chapter 8 (2000-01, in RSH's class): 7 dapim
- Makkot (2005-07, with ALG): 23 dapim
Tuesday, September 27, 2005
Great expectations
Makkot 3a, continued:
Last week we spent the entire time on a single mishnah and the two lines of Gemara that belong to it. ALG reports that her friend called it the hardest mishnah in Sha"s, and that the problem with it is that it doesn't make any sense. This may explain why the rishonim go so crazy about it -- they're groping around in the dark trying to figure out what it means, and tripping over each other.
The basic premise seems reasonable. We're continuing with a list of cases where the eidim zomemin don't actually pay the penalty that would have been imposed on the person being testified against. Suppose Homer testifies that Kirk divorced his wife Luann and didn't pay her the amount of her ketubah (severance pay), let's say 200 zuz, and then Homer's testimony is invalidated. It wouldn't make sense to make Homer pay 200 zuz, because Homer wouldn't actually have cost Kirk 200 zuz -- if indeed Kirk didn't divorce Luann just now, he would have eventually had to pay her ketubah at some point down the line anyway. So what loss would Homer actually have imposed on Kirk (and thus, what does Homer have to pay)? If you, like me, thought the issue was about the time value of money, and the question of whether Kirk would have to pay now or later, then you would be wrong, but it would have taken you a long time to realize the error of your ways. (The next mishnah apparently is about the time value of money, though.) Really, it's more like insurance or gambling or the futures market -- the current price of the ketubah is decreased because there is a probability that it will eventually be worth its face value, and a probability that it will be worth nothing. So the current value of the ketubah represents the expectation value of how it will eventually turn out, with some adjustment for risk. (Or something like that -- I'm speaking as a physicist, not an economist, so I'm sure I'm using the wrong terminology.) There is some chance that Kirk will divorce Luann or die first, so Kirk (or his estate) will owe 200 zuz, and there's also a chance that Luann will die first, so Kirk owes her nothing and gets to keep whatever assets he had set aside for the ketubah. Thus, the actual value of the ketubah is somewhere between 0 and 200 (depending on these probabilities and other things), and thus that's what Homer has to pay Kirk.
That's the Mishnah. The Gemara then asks "How is this calculated?". A fair question. Three amoraim give three different answers: 1) with the husband, 2) with the wife, 3) with the wife and her ketubah. And that's all the Gemara on this Mishnah.
Well, that was perfectly clear to me!!!
Wait, no it wasn't. And the rishonim don't think so either. I confess that we didn't do an exhaustive survey of the guys in the back, but we spent a lot of time on Rashi, glanced at Tosafot (which is usually scary, but gives examples with numbers this time), and read the Rambam.
Rashi frames the situation like this: both the husband and the wife have a potential claim. The wife's claim is (the value of the ketubah) * (the probability that the husband will die first or divorce her); call this w. The husband's claim is (the value of the assets set aside for the ketubah) * (the probability that the wife will die first); call this h. So the machloket in the Gemara is about which of these is used to calculate what Homer owes in the Mishnah: does he pay h (since he would have prevented Kirk from possibly collecting this), or does he pay w (for reasons I don't quite understand, and I don't think Rashi does either), or does he pay 200 zuz minus w (since he would have made Kirk definitely pay 200 zuz instead of just maybe)? I think that's the idea -- I might still have it completely wrong. (And I don't see why it shouldn't involve some combination of h and w, but what do I know.)
Rambam (Hilchot Eidut 21:1) goes with the third opinion (the wife and her ketubah) and understands this to mean that the wife herself (i.e. the actual persn) is used to calculate the amount. For example, if the wife is old or sick, or the couple gets along well, then it's less likely that she'll collect her ketubah (since she'll die before he dies or divorces her), so the value goes down. But if she's young or healthy, or the couple is in conflict, then it's more likely that she'll collect (since he'll die or divorce her before she dies), so the value goes up.
Let me know if this understanding is totally wrong.
Last week we spent the entire time on a single mishnah and the two lines of Gemara that belong to it. ALG reports that her friend called it the hardest mishnah in Sha"s, and that the problem with it is that it doesn't make any sense. This may explain why the rishonim go so crazy about it -- they're groping around in the dark trying to figure out what it means, and tripping over each other.
The basic premise seems reasonable. We're continuing with a list of cases where the eidim zomemin don't actually pay the penalty that would have been imposed on the person being testified against. Suppose Homer testifies that Kirk divorced his wife Luann and didn't pay her the amount of her ketubah (severance pay), let's say 200 zuz, and then Homer's testimony is invalidated. It wouldn't make sense to make Homer pay 200 zuz, because Homer wouldn't actually have cost Kirk 200 zuz -- if indeed Kirk didn't divorce Luann just now, he would have eventually had to pay her ketubah at some point down the line anyway. So what loss would Homer actually have imposed on Kirk (and thus, what does Homer have to pay)? If you, like me, thought the issue was about the time value of money, and the question of whether Kirk would have to pay now or later, then you would be wrong, but it would have taken you a long time to realize the error of your ways. (The next mishnah apparently is about the time value of money, though.) Really, it's more like insurance or gambling or the futures market -- the current price of the ketubah is decreased because there is a probability that it will eventually be worth its face value, and a probability that it will be worth nothing. So the current value of the ketubah represents the expectation value of how it will eventually turn out, with some adjustment for risk. (Or something like that -- I'm speaking as a physicist, not an economist, so I'm sure I'm using the wrong terminology.) There is some chance that Kirk will divorce Luann or die first, so Kirk (or his estate) will owe 200 zuz, and there's also a chance that Luann will die first, so Kirk owes her nothing and gets to keep whatever assets he had set aside for the ketubah. Thus, the actual value of the ketubah is somewhere between 0 and 200 (depending on these probabilities and other things), and thus that's what Homer has to pay Kirk.
That's the Mishnah. The Gemara then asks "How is this calculated?". A fair question. Three amoraim give three different answers: 1) with the husband, 2) with the wife, 3) with the wife and her ketubah. And that's all the Gemara on this Mishnah.
Well, that was perfectly clear to me!!!
Wait, no it wasn't. And the rishonim don't think so either. I confess that we didn't do an exhaustive survey of the guys in the back, but we spent a lot of time on Rashi, glanced at Tosafot (which is usually scary, but gives examples with numbers this time), and read the Rambam.
Rashi frames the situation like this: both the husband and the wife have a potential claim. The wife's claim is (the value of the ketubah) * (the probability that the husband will die first or divorce her); call this w. The husband's claim is (the value of the assets set aside for the ketubah) * (the probability that the wife will die first); call this h. So the machloket in the Gemara is about which of these is used to calculate what Homer owes in the Mishnah: does he pay h (since he would have prevented Kirk from possibly collecting this), or does he pay w (for reasons I don't quite understand, and I don't think Rashi does either), or does he pay 200 zuz minus w (since he would have made Kirk definitely pay 200 zuz instead of just maybe)? I think that's the idea -- I might still have it completely wrong. (And I don't see why it shouldn't involve some combination of h and w, but what do I know.)
Rambam (Hilchot Eidut 21:1) goes with the third opinion (the wife and her ketubah) and understands this to mean that the wife herself (i.e. the actual persn) is used to calculate the amount. For example, if the wife is old or sick, or the couple gets along well, then it's less likely that she'll collect her ketubah (since she'll die before he dies or divorces her), so the value goes down. But if she's young or healthy, or the couple is in conflict, then it's more likely that she'll collect (since he'll die or divorce her before she dies), so the value goes up.
Let me know if this understanding is totally wrong.
Sunday, September 25, 2005
Wanna know what I'm buying, Ringo?
Now I'm finally catching up on blogging Makkot!
Last fortnight we learned 2b-3a. In Exodus 21:29-30, the Torah says that if an ox kills someone (when the ox has done so on the past, so the owner should have known to keep the ox under lock and key), the owner is responsible for criminally negligent homicide, and is put to death. However, the owner might be given the opportunity to pay a ransom (kofer) and stay alive.
In a baraita on 2b, we learn that an eid zomeim may not pay this kofer. E.g., if Homer testifies falsely that Ned's ox killed Lenny (such that Ned would be sentenced to death), and then Homer's testimony is invalidated, Homer doesn't get the opportunity to pay a kofer for his life (even though Ned would, if his conviction were to stand).
Why?
The Gemara places this baraita into the larger debate about the nature of the kofer. A baraita from Bava Kamma brings two opinions about the amount of the kofer. Insofar as it is possible to place a monetary value on a human life, one opinion is that Ned (if convicted of letting his ox kill Lenny) would pay the value of Lenny's life, and another is that Ned would pay the value of his own life. The Gemara suggests that the first opinion believes that the kofer is monetary damages for wrongful death (so Ned is compensating Lenny's heirs for the loss of their beloved), while the second opinion believes that the kofer is kapparah: some sort of metaphysical atonement to restore balance to the Force (so Ned is buying back his own life, a la the concluding scene of Pulp Fiction). Rav Papa rejects this dichotomy: he says that "the whole world" agrees about the essence of the kofer (it's kapparah), and it's just a difference of opinion about how it gets calculated. So the baraita here in Makkot is also of the opinion that kofer is kapparah, and because Homer doesn't have any deaths (real ones, not attempted ones) to atone for (since he had no responsibility for Lenny's death), he doesn't get this opportunity for kapparah.
Exodus 22:2 says that a thief shall make restitution, and if the thief has nothing to pay back, then s/he will be sold into slavery instead. The baraita goes on to teach that if Homer frames Ned for theft (such that Ned would have to be sold), Homer doesn't get sold for this. Rav Hamnuna (after some adjustments) interprets this to mean that if either Homer or Ned owns any property, then Homer doesn't get sold, but if neither of them owns property, then he does. (If Homer doesn't have property and Ned does, then Homer doesn't get sold, since he wouldn't have caused Ned to be sold. If Homer has property and Ned doesn't, then Homer doesn't get sold, since that's only for people who have nothing.) Rava disagrees and says that being sold is only for actual thieves, not for those who frame others as thieves.
Rabbi Akiva says that if Homer frames Ned and then turns himself in (rather than being invalidated by other witnesses who say "You couldn't have been there to see Ned commit that crime - you were with us at Moe's!"), then he's not subject to the usual penalties for edim zomemin. All you perjurers out there, listen up! It's not too late!
Last fortnight we learned 2b-3a. In Exodus 21:29-30, the Torah says that if an ox kills someone (when the ox has done so on the past, so the owner should have known to keep the ox under lock and key), the owner is responsible for criminally negligent homicide, and is put to death. However, the owner might be given the opportunity to pay a ransom (kofer) and stay alive.
In a baraita on 2b, we learn that an eid zomeim may not pay this kofer. E.g., if Homer testifies falsely that Ned's ox killed Lenny (such that Ned would be sentenced to death), and then Homer's testimony is invalidated, Homer doesn't get the opportunity to pay a kofer for his life (even though Ned would, if his conviction were to stand).
Why?
The Gemara places this baraita into the larger debate about the nature of the kofer. A baraita from Bava Kamma brings two opinions about the amount of the kofer. Insofar as it is possible to place a monetary value on a human life, one opinion is that Ned (if convicted of letting his ox kill Lenny) would pay the value of Lenny's life, and another is that Ned would pay the value of his own life. The Gemara suggests that the first opinion believes that the kofer is monetary damages for wrongful death (so Ned is compensating Lenny's heirs for the loss of their beloved), while the second opinion believes that the kofer is kapparah: some sort of metaphysical atonement to restore balance to the Force (so Ned is buying back his own life, a la the concluding scene of Pulp Fiction). Rav Papa rejects this dichotomy: he says that "the whole world" agrees about the essence of the kofer (it's kapparah), and it's just a difference of opinion about how it gets calculated. So the baraita here in Makkot is also of the opinion that kofer is kapparah, and because Homer doesn't have any deaths (real ones, not attempted ones) to atone for (since he had no responsibility for Lenny's death), he doesn't get this opportunity for kapparah.
Exodus 22:2 says that a thief shall make restitution, and if the thief has nothing to pay back, then s/he will be sold into slavery instead. The baraita goes on to teach that if Homer frames Ned for theft (such that Ned would have to be sold), Homer doesn't get sold for this. Rav Hamnuna (after some adjustments) interprets this to mean that if either Homer or Ned owns any property, then Homer doesn't get sold, but if neither of them owns property, then he does. (If Homer doesn't have property and Ned does, then Homer doesn't get sold, since he wouldn't have caused Ned to be sold. If Homer has property and Ned doesn't, then Homer doesn't get sold, since that's only for people who have nothing.) Rava disagrees and says that being sold is only for actual thieves, not for those who frame others as thieves.
Rabbi Akiva says that if Homer frames Ned and then turns himself in (rather than being invalidated by other witnesses who say "You couldn't have been there to see Ned commit that crime - you were with us at Moe's!"), then he's not subject to the usual penalties for edim zomemin. All you perjurers out there, listen up! It's not too late!
Monday, September 05, 2005
Walking and chewing gum
Is it possible to walk and chew gum at the same time? How about learning two tractates at the same time? We shall see.
I just started studying Masechet Makkot with ALG. This continues the trend of learning short, manageable masechtot (after finishing Sukkah and Rosh Hashanah and starting Megillah). However, the subject matter is a major shift; instead of dealing with a holiday, Makkot deals with criminal justice. ALG learned it once before, in a dream. She owns a copy of Masechet Makkot containing handwritten notes in her own handwriting, but she has no memory of when or where she learned it before. So she gets to see it again for the first time.
Makkot is only three chapters (24 dapim), and some think it was originally part of Masechet Sanhedrin that split off later. Contrary to popular belief, it's not all about makkot (flogging as a punishment for certain offenses, based on Deuteronomy 25:1-3); only the third chapter is. The second chapter is about the accidental killer, who has to flee to a city of refuge (see Numbers 35).
We started by learning all the mishnayot of the first chapter; those will be discussed when we get to them again in the Gemara. It's very appropriate that we started this week, because the first chapter is based on Parshat Shofetim. It deals with the 'edim zomemin (see Deuteronomy 19:16-18): If Homer testifies against Ned, and then Homer's testimony is shown to be false (and as we'll see in a later mishnah, this rule only applies if it is shown that Homer himself couldn't have been there to witness the events, not if merely the content of his testimony is refuted), then Homer is liable to whatever punishment his testimony would have brought upon Ned, from a monetary fine all the way to execution.
The first mishnah cleverly combines the themes of all three chapters. It starts: How do witnesses become zomemin? If Homer says "We testify that Ned is the son of [a kohein and] a divorced woman" or "the son of [a kohein and] a chalutzah" (which would disqualify Ned from priestly service) and then Homer's testimony is invalidated, we don't say "Homer gets the status of a son of a divorced woman / chalutzah"; instead Homer just gets beaten 40 times (the standard catch-all punishment). If Homer says "We testify that Ned [is an accidental killer and] has to be exiled [to the city of refuge]" and his testimony is invalidated, we don't exile Homer to the city of refuge; again, he gets beaten 40 times.
So there you have it: 'edim zomemin, exile to the city of refuge, and makkot all together.
As is common at the very beginning of a masechet, the Gemara's first question is "Who am I? Why am I here?" More specifically, what's with that first question "How do witnesses become zomemin?"? Based on the examples in that mishnah (where Homer doesn't get the punishment he tried to bring upon Ned), the question should be "How do witnesses not become zomemin?"! Aw, snap! Furthermore, we have another mishnah that actually answers the question "How do witnesses become zomemin" -- it's the one about how the witness himself has to be invalidated, not just the content of the testimony. So what's going on here?
The answer is that this is a (sort of) seamless continuation of Sanhedrin. The last mishnah of Sanhedrin (if you're going by the order of standalone Mishnah editions, where Cheilek is chapter 10 and Eilu hein hanechenakin is chapter 11, rather than vice versa as in Talmud editions) says that all zomemin in capital cases get the same type of execution as the crime that they're testifying about, except an adulterous bat kohein (she gets burned; someone who falsely testifies her gets strangled). And (the Gemara now fills in the gap) there are some cases of 'edim zomemin where they don't get this kind of poetic justice at all, but just get makkot. How? Well, if Homer testifies that Ned is the son of a divorced woman....
Now that we've established how we got here, the next question is why? In that first case, why doesn't Homer just become disqualified from the priesthood, as he tried to do to Ned? Because the rule in Deuteronomy 19:19 is "do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow". Do to him, not to his offspring. Being a chalal is hereditary, so if Homer became a chalal, this would be passed on to Bart, Lisa, and Maggie. Ok, so why not disqualify just Homer, and leave his kids out of it? Well, that doesn't work either, because then it wouldn't be "as he schemed to do", since Homer schemed to disqualify Ned along with Rod and Todd, not just Ned.
Bar Pada tries a logical argument to reach the same result: someone who disqualifies others (e.g. a kohein who marries a divorced woman so that his kids are disqualified) is not himself disqualified, so kal vachomer someone who tries to disqualify others (i.e. an 'ed zomeim whose plan is foiled) shouldn't be disqualified himself.
Ravina says nice try, but in that case you unravel the whole system of 'edim zomemin! Someone who successfully testifies to have someone executed isn't executed, therefore you could say that kal vachomer someone who unsuccessfully testifies to have someone executed shouldn't be executed. So get your logic out of here.
And why can't Homer be exiled to the city of refuge? Because Deuteronomy 19:5 says "he shall flee to one of these cities" -- he [the accidental killer], not someone who testifies against him. A similar logical argument is attempted as a supplementary reason, but it gets shot down as well.
Ok, so if the 'ed zomeim can't be exiled, what's the source for him being beaten? Deuteronomy 25:1-2 says "v'hitzdiku et hatzadik v'hirshi'u et harasha'". The 'ed zomeim testified against the tzadik (meaning innocent in this case) that he was a rasha', and then other witnesses came and cleared the name of the one who was originally tzadik, so that the 'ed zomeim now becomes the rasha' (guilty), and is thus subject to makkot.
Well ok, you could do this contortionist reading of Deuteronomy 25, but why not just say that the 'ed zomeim violated "Don't bear false witness" (one of the Ten frickin Commandments), and is thus subject to makkot as the catch-all punishment for violating a negative commandment? Because a lav she'ein bo ma'aseh (a negative commandment that doesn't involve action, and I guess speech doesn't count as action) isn't subject to makkot.
If I may be heretical, I wonder if maybe the Mishnah didn't know this principle about lav she'ein bo ma'aseh, so the Mishnah thought it was just applying the usual catch-all punishment, and it's not until later rabbis came up with that principle that they had to come up with the contortionist reading instead.
A baraita says that there are four things that don't apply to 'edim zomemin: they don't get the status of the son of a divorced woman, they don't get exiled [as in the Mishnah], they don't pay ransom (see Exodus 21:30), and they don't get sold as slaves. Rabbi Akiva adds that they don't pay the penalty if they turn themselves in as perjurers, but only if someone else contradicts their testimony.
And we'll stop there.
I just started studying Masechet Makkot with ALG. This continues the trend of learning short, manageable masechtot (after finishing Sukkah and Rosh Hashanah and starting Megillah). However, the subject matter is a major shift; instead of dealing with a holiday, Makkot deals with criminal justice. ALG learned it once before, in a dream. She owns a copy of Masechet Makkot containing handwritten notes in her own handwriting, but she has no memory of when or where she learned it before. So she gets to see it again for the first time.
Makkot is only three chapters (24 dapim), and some think it was originally part of Masechet Sanhedrin that split off later. Contrary to popular belief, it's not all about makkot (flogging as a punishment for certain offenses, based on Deuteronomy 25:1-3); only the third chapter is. The second chapter is about the accidental killer, who has to flee to a city of refuge (see Numbers 35).
We started by learning all the mishnayot of the first chapter; those will be discussed when we get to them again in the Gemara. It's very appropriate that we started this week, because the first chapter is based on Parshat Shofetim. It deals with the 'edim zomemin (see Deuteronomy 19:16-18): If Homer testifies against Ned, and then Homer's testimony is shown to be false (and as we'll see in a later mishnah, this rule only applies if it is shown that Homer himself couldn't have been there to witness the events, not if merely the content of his testimony is refuted), then Homer is liable to whatever punishment his testimony would have brought upon Ned, from a monetary fine all the way to execution.
The first mishnah cleverly combines the themes of all three chapters. It starts: How do witnesses become zomemin? If Homer says "We testify that Ned is the son of [a kohein and] a divorced woman" or "the son of [a kohein and] a chalutzah" (which would disqualify Ned from priestly service) and then Homer's testimony is invalidated, we don't say "Homer gets the status of a son of a divorced woman / chalutzah"; instead Homer just gets beaten 40 times (the standard catch-all punishment). If Homer says "We testify that Ned [is an accidental killer and] has to be exiled [to the city of refuge]" and his testimony is invalidated, we don't exile Homer to the city of refuge; again, he gets beaten 40 times.
So there you have it: 'edim zomemin, exile to the city of refuge, and makkot all together.
As is common at the very beginning of a masechet, the Gemara's first question is "Who am I? Why am I here?" More specifically, what's with that first question "How do witnesses become zomemin?"? Based on the examples in that mishnah (where Homer doesn't get the punishment he tried to bring upon Ned), the question should be "How do witnesses not become zomemin?"! Aw, snap! Furthermore, we have another mishnah that actually answers the question "How do witnesses become zomemin" -- it's the one about how the witness himself has to be invalidated, not just the content of the testimony. So what's going on here?
The answer is that this is a (sort of) seamless continuation of Sanhedrin. The last mishnah of Sanhedrin (if you're going by the order of standalone Mishnah editions, where Cheilek is chapter 10 and Eilu hein hanechenakin is chapter 11, rather than vice versa as in Talmud editions) says that all zomemin in capital cases get the same type of execution as the crime that they're testifying about, except an adulterous bat kohein (she gets burned; someone who falsely testifies her gets strangled). And (the Gemara now fills in the gap) there are some cases of 'edim zomemin where they don't get this kind of poetic justice at all, but just get makkot. How? Well, if Homer testifies that Ned is the son of a divorced woman....
Now that we've established how we got here, the next question is why? In that first case, why doesn't Homer just become disqualified from the priesthood, as he tried to do to Ned? Because the rule in Deuteronomy 19:19 is "do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow". Do to him, not to his offspring. Being a chalal is hereditary, so if Homer became a chalal, this would be passed on to Bart, Lisa, and Maggie. Ok, so why not disqualify just Homer, and leave his kids out of it? Well, that doesn't work either, because then it wouldn't be "as he schemed to do", since Homer schemed to disqualify Ned along with Rod and Todd, not just Ned.
Bar Pada tries a logical argument to reach the same result: someone who disqualifies others (e.g. a kohein who marries a divorced woman so that his kids are disqualified) is not himself disqualified, so kal vachomer someone who tries to disqualify others (i.e. an 'ed zomeim whose plan is foiled) shouldn't be disqualified himself.
Ravina says nice try, but in that case you unravel the whole system of 'edim zomemin! Someone who successfully testifies to have someone executed isn't executed, therefore you could say that kal vachomer someone who unsuccessfully testifies to have someone executed shouldn't be executed. So get your logic out of here.
And why can't Homer be exiled to the city of refuge? Because Deuteronomy 19:5 says "he shall flee to one of these cities" -- he [the accidental killer], not someone who testifies against him. A similar logical argument is attempted as a supplementary reason, but it gets shot down as well.
Ok, so if the 'ed zomeim can't be exiled, what's the source for him being beaten? Deuteronomy 25:1-2 says "v'hitzdiku et hatzadik v'hirshi'u et harasha'". The 'ed zomeim testified against the tzadik (meaning innocent in this case) that he was a rasha', and then other witnesses came and cleared the name of the one who was originally tzadik, so that the 'ed zomeim now becomes the rasha' (guilty), and is thus subject to makkot.
Well ok, you could do this contortionist reading of Deuteronomy 25, but why not just say that the 'ed zomeim violated "Don't bear false witness" (one of the Ten frickin Commandments), and is thus subject to makkot as the catch-all punishment for violating a negative commandment? Because a lav she'ein bo ma'aseh (a negative commandment that doesn't involve action, and I guess speech doesn't count as action) isn't subject to makkot.
If I may be heretical, I wonder if maybe the Mishnah didn't know this principle about lav she'ein bo ma'aseh, so the Mishnah thought it was just applying the usual catch-all punishment, and it's not until later rabbis came up with that principle that they had to come up with the contortionist reading instead.
A baraita says that there are four things that don't apply to 'edim zomemin: they don't get the status of the son of a divorced woman, they don't get exiled [as in the Mishnah], they don't pay ransom (see Exodus 21:30), and they don't get sold as slaves. Rabbi Akiva adds that they don't pay the penalty if they turn themselves in as perjurers, but only if someone else contradicts their testimony.
And we'll stop there.
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